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Abstract: Mobile Ad Hoc Network is a self-configurable and self-organizing wire-
less network of mobile devices without fixed infrastructure support, which makes it
a good candidate as underlying communication network for the Cyber-Physical Sys-
tems in emergency conditions such as earthquake, flood, and battlefields. In these
scenarios, efficient communication schemes with security support are especially de-
sired. Two cryptography approaches, the public key cryptography and the identity-
based cryptography, face the costly and complex key management problem and the
“key escrow" problem in the real-life deployment. Recently, the certificateless public
key cryptography (CL-PKC) was introduced to address these problems in previous
approaches. However, the efficiency of the schemes based on CL-PKC is not high
and can be improved further.
In this paper, we present an improved certificateless signature scheme (McCLS)
based on bilinear pairings. First, we theoretically compare the efficiency of McCLS
with that of existing certificateless signature schemes (CLS). Second, an empirical
study is conducted to compare the traditional AODV with the McCLS scheme based
on AODV (McDV) in their efficiency and effectiveness against two most common
attacks (i.e. redirection attack and rushing attack). Results from theoretical analysis
show that the new McCLS scheme is more efficient than existing CLS solutions, and
results from empirical studies show that the McDV is able to resist the two common
attacks without causing substantial degradation of the network performance.
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1 Introduction
A salient feature of cyber-physical systems (CPS) is that it integrates computing, monitoring, and
communication capabilities, and constantly interacts with the physical environment. As a result, cyber-
physical system must be dependable, safe, secure and efficient [16].
Many emergency applications such as earthquake, flood and battlefields [10] proposed for CPS will
be implemented on networked environments where computing devices are connected through wireless
links. For many applications such as the military applications, fixed infrastructure may not be available
in the environment or even be destroyed [9]. It is important to solve the connectivity problems with
self-configurable and self-organizing characteristics. A possible solution for the lack of communication
means is deployment of the Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs).
While MANETs provide a great flexibility for establishing communications, they are particularly
prone to the security threats of eavesdropping, interception and routing attacks. Some of these problems
may be solved or mitigated with the use of cryptographic schemes [7]. In the recent literature many
papers make specific proposals on determining how to use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [27, 23, 4, 15]
and Identity-Based Public Key Cryptography (ID-PKC) [20, 13, 8, 25] cryptographic techniques to
secure MANETs.
The traditional PKI signature scheme uses a centralized certificate authority to issue a digital cer-
tificate that binds a user with the corresponding public key. The requirement of certificate authority
inevitably leads to complex certificate management problems in practice.
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The ID-PKC which was introduced by Shamir [20] is developed from traditional PKI to simplify
the certificate management process. In the ID-PKC based scheme, user’s public key is derived directly
from certain aspects of his identity such as email address which is assumed to be publicly known. A
private key is generated by a trusted third party – Private Key Generator (PKG). However, a new inherent
problem is brought by this approach, namely the “key escrow" problem since the private key of user
is known to the PKG. As a result, the PKG is able to impersonate any user of its choice, or decrypt
messages.
In order to solve the costly and complex key management problems in PKI and the “key escrow"
problem in ID-PKC respectively, Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] proposed the first Certificateless Public
key Cryptography (CL-PKC) scheme. In the certificateless signature (CLS) scheme, Key Generation
Center (KGC) only provides user with a partial private key, which is related to the user’s identity and the
master private key only known by PKC. Then the user generates the remaining part of the private key
and the corresponding public key. As a result, the KGC does not know the user’s private key because the
user’s private key is generated by user itself, thereby solving the “key escrow" problem in ID-PKC based
schemes.
However, CLS schemes are usually computationally intensive, and hence they are not readily appli-
cable in practical applications. In this paper, we present McCLS scheme, a new CLS scheme for mobile
wireless cyber-physical systems.
Compared with existing CLS schemes, McCLS scheme only requires one pairing operation in the
verification phase, and none in the signing phase. Since the pairing operation is the most time-consuming
computation in pairing-based cryptosystems, our McCLS scheme has less computation overhead and
therefore is more efficient than those schemes proposed previously in [1, 12, 14, 26]. We also pro-
vide a detailed security proof for McCLS scheme based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
(CDHP) [6]. Then an empirical study is conducted to compare the McCLS based on AODV (McDV)
with the traditional AODV in their efficiency and effectiveness against the two most common attacks,
redirection attack and rushing attack, based on QualNet simulation software [19]. Results show that our
scheme is efficient in terms of computation overhead and it can resist redirection attack [18] and rushing
attack [11].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description on the
related work. Section 3 introduces the preliminaries and the background on the security model and the
attack model. Section 4 presents our efficient McCLS scheme. Section 5 analyzes the security of McCLS
scheme in detail. Section 6 evaluates the performance of McCLS scheme under the redirection attack
and the rushing attack. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper with summaries and the directions of
future work.
2 Related Work
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are physical and engineered systems whose operations are integrated,
monitored, and controlled by a computational core [17]. CPS integrate the communication and compu-
tation with the physical process [2]. Since cyber-physical systems constantly interact with the physical
environment, they must be dependable, safe, secure and efficient [16].
CPS is a new active research area. The position papers published in the NSF workshop on Cyber-
Physical System [16] presents a good overview of the different aspects of CPS research. Though security
is an important research issue of CPS , little work has been done [3] so far for the security of CPS.
Since many emergency applications proposed for CPS will be implemented on mobile ad hoc net-
works (MANETs), it is natural to ask the question if security schemes proposed for MANETs are prac-
tical for CPS. To overcome the security problems in MANETs due to their infrastructure-less nature,
we need some new methods to solve these problems. One of these methods is the lightweight and effi-
cient key management scheme. Recently, in order to solve the key management problem in public key
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cryptography and “key escrow" problem in identity-based cryptography schemes, Al-Riyami and Pater-
son [1] proposed the first certificateless signature (CLS) scheme but fail to provide the security proof.
Later, Huang et al. [12] found that this CLS scheme was insecure against a Type I forger attack. A
modified CLS scheme was proposed with security proved under the random oracle model [5]. However,
the scheme requires more pairing operations than the original scheme proposed in [1]. In [14], Li et al.
therefore, proposed another CLS scheme, with a formal security analysis omitted. Another shortcoming
of this scheme is that the verification algorithm requires four quite expensive pairing operations. Zhang et
al. [26] presented a CLS scheme with a formal security analysis but it still needs four pairing operations
in the verification phase. Following that, Yap et al. [22] proposed a new CLS scheme, which requires no
pairing operation in the signing phase but requires two pairing operations in the verification phase.
However, since pairing operations are costly in computation and are usually time consuming, using
more pairing operations in the scheme will make it difficult to be applied for emergency cyber-physical
systems, because CPS need constantly interact with the physical environment and with stringent timing
requirements. In this paper, we present McCLS scheme, which is more efficient and hence is a good
alternative to be used in cyber-physical systems.
A good security protocol must be resilient against security attacks. In the following, we briefly
introduce two most commonly studied attacks. Later in this paper, we prove that the proposed McCLS
scheme is resilient against these two attacks.
Redirection attack [18] is one of the many possible attacks in MANETs. In this attack, a malicious
node sends a forged Route Reply (RREP) packet to a source node by altering control message fields with
falsified values. When a source node receives multiple RREPs, by comparing the destination sequence
numbers contained in RREP packets, it regards the largest one as the most recent routing information
and selects the route through which that RREP packet has been sent. If the attacker sends the RREP with
destination sequence number higher than that of the real destination node to the source node, the data
traffic will be directed toward the attacker. It then drops all data packets it receives instead of forwarding
them to the next node on the routing path. Consequently, the source and destination nodes will lose
communication with each other.
Rushing attack [11] usually aims at a reactive routing protocol. Every node in the network only
forwards the first route discovery packet that it receives and drops the rest. Malicious nodes can “rush"
the route request packets towards the destination. As a result, the nodes that receive these “rushed"
request packets forward them and discard other route requests that arrive later. The resulted routes would
then include the malicious nodes. In this way, the attacker is placed in an advantageous position.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we present some mathematical background which helps in realizing CLS based on
the bilinear pairing. It is commonly used in CLS schemes to realize signature and verification [1, 12, 14].
We define two cyclic groups G1,G2, where G1 is an additive group and G2 is a multiplicative group,
where both groups have a prime order p. Let e be a computable bilinear map e : G1×G1 →G2. We have
the following conditions:
1. Bilinearity: For any P,Q,R ∈ G1, we have e(P +Q,R) = e(P,R)e(Q,R). For a,b ∈ Z∗p and P,Q ∈
G1, we have e(aP,bQ) = e(P,Q)ab = e(P,abP) = e(abP,P).
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P,Q ∈ G1, such that e(P,Q) 6= 1.
3. Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1
The map e will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field.
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An efficiently computable bilinear map e provides an algorithm for solving the Decision Diffie-
Hellman Problem (DDHP) [6]. That is, given (P,aP,bP,cP)∈G1 and a,b∈Z∗p, decide whether c≡ ab∈
Z
∗
p.
In bilinear pairing, Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is easy and Computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) problem [22] is still hard. That is, for a,b ∈ Z∗p, given (P,aP,bP), computing abP
is infeasible.
3.1 Certificateless scheme
Usually, a certificateless signature (CLS) scheme consists of five polynomial time algorithms [1]:
• Setup. KGC runs a probabilistic algorithm to initialize the system. It receives a security parameter
k and returns a randomly chosen master key and a list of public parameters param.
• Extract Partial Private Key. KGC takes the master key and an identity ID ∈ {0,1}∗ as inputs,
and outputs a private partial key DID.
• Generate Key Pair. The user takes a list of public parameters param as inputs, outputs a private
key SID and a public key PID.
• CL-Sign. The user takes a list of public parameters param, full private keys (DID,SID), and a
message M to produce a signature σ on M.
• CL-Verify. Anyone in this algorithm may take {param, ID,PID} and a message M as inputs, and
outputs true if and only if σ is the valid signature, or a symbol ⊥ to indicate a failure.
We may note that, once the user received the public parameters, such as public key of KGC, user
chooses secret value to generate his key pair including user’s private key and user’s public key. Thus the
user’s full private key is composed of the partial private key generated by KGC and the user’s private key
generated by user himself. Neither the KGC nor the user can generate the full private keys by himself,
therefore solving the “key escrow" problem.
3.2 Adversarial Model
As defined in [1, 22], there are two types of adversaries, Type I and Type II, with different capabilities.
In CLS, Type I Adversary AI acts as a third part who tries to impersonate a user. It is not allowed to know
the KGC’s master private key. However, AI can replace the public key PID with values of its choice due to
nature of the public key generated by the user. This means the adversary is able to fool the user accepting
the signature, which is signed by the adversary’s public key. Type II adversary AII represents a malicious
KGC who knows the master private key. That is, AII can compute the partial private key by itself. But
AII does not know the user’s private key SID and it cannot replace the user’s public keys PID .
Definition 1. A CLS scheme is secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen message and ID
attacks against adversary A, of Type I or Type II if no polynomial time algorithm has a non-negligible
advantage against a challenger C in the following game [1]:
1. The challenger C takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup algorithm. Challenger C gives A
the system parameters param. If A is of Type I, the challenge C keeps the master private key to
itself. Otherwise, C gives the master private key to A.
2. A can request C to answer the following types of queries:
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• Partial Key Extraction (For Type I adversary only). C returns to A’s partial private key DID
as the result of running Extract Partial Private Key algorithm.
• Secret Value and Public Key Extraction. C returns to A’s private key SID associated with
A’s public key PID as the result of running Extract Partial Private Key and Generate Key
Pair algorithms. In the case of Type I adversary, C returns if the user’s public key PID has
been replaced.
• Public Key Replacement (For Type I adversary only). A can replace the associated public
key PID to a new public key P′ID which is chosen by itself.
• Sign. C returns a valid signature σ using CL-sign algorithm regardless whether the public
key PID has been replaced or not.
3. Eventually, A outputs a signature (ID∗,m∗,σ∗). A wins game if Veri f y(param,PID∗ ,m∗,σ∗) =
true and the generated output fulfills the following conditions:
• CL-Sign(ID∗,m∗) has never been queried.
• If adversary A is Type I, ID∗ has not been submitted to Partial Key Extraction.
• If adversary A is Type II, ID∗ has not been submitted to Secret Value and Public Key
Extraction.
4 McCLS Scheme
McCLS scheme is motivated by the identity-based signature from [24]. Our verification phase al-
gorithm requires one pairing operation only, hence McCLS scheme outperforms the other existing CLS
schemes in terms of efficiency. Besides, message signing in McCLS scheme is fast as it involves no
pairing computation. McCLS scheme is comprised of the following five stages.
• Setup. Given a cyclic group G1 of prime order p, with an admissible pairing e and its generator
P, KGC picks s ∈ Z∗p and sets Ppub = sP. Then Chooses two hash functions H1 : {0,1}∗ → G1
and H2 : {0,1}∗×G1 → Z∗p. The public system parameter list is (P,Ppub,H1,H2), and the master
private key is msk = s.
• Extract Partial Private Key. Given an identity ID, KGC computes QID = H1(ID) and DID =
sH1(ID) . Output DID as the partial private key corresponding to QID = H1(ID).
• Generate Key Pair. The user generates a secret value x ∈ Z∗p, the public key is PID = xPpub. The
user’s private key is SID = x.
• Sign. Given the user’s full private keys (DID,SID) and a message M, user picks a number r ∈ Z∗p
and outputs a signature σ = (V,S,R) where S = 1
SID
DID, R = (r−SID)P and V = H2(M,R,PID)rP.
• Verification. Given the signature (V,S,R) of a message M for the identity ID, anyone in this algo-
rithm can act a verifier to compute h = H2(M,R,PID). Then checks whether (Ppub,V−hR,S/h,QID)
is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple, that is, computes whether e(Ppub,QID) = e(V − hR,S/h). If yes,
accept the signature. Otherwise, reject it.
5 Analysis of McCLS Scheme
In this section, we analyze the correctness, performance and security proof of McCLS scheme.
400 Zhong Xu, Xue Liu, Guoqing Zhang, Wenbo He
5.1 Correctness
The correctness of McCLS scheme can be verified as follows:
e(V −hR,S/h)
= e(hrP−hrP+ xhP,S/h)
= e(xhP,DID/xh)
= e(Ppub,QID).
Note that e(Ppub,QID) is independent of the message, and only needs to be computed once and for
all. So McCLS scheme is more efficient than other previous schemes.
5.2 Performance
McCLS scheme only requires two scalar multiplication in signature phase and two scalar multiplica-
tion computations and one pairing operation in verification phase. The pairing operations are expensive
comparing with scalar multiplication and exponentiation.
The comparison between the exiting schemes and McCLS scheme according to efficiency of sign
and verification algorithms and the length of public keys is shown in Table 1. It shows that McCLS
scheme has the lowest pairing operations requirement and has the same length of public key as other
CLS schemes.
Table 1: Comparison of the CLS Schemes
AP [1] LCS [14] ZWXF [26] YHG [22] McCLS
Sign 1p+3s 2s 3s 2s 2s
Verify 4p+1e 4p+2s 4p 2p+3s 1p+3s
Pklen 2 points 2 points 1 points 1 point 1 point
Pklen: the public key length;
s: the scalar multiplication computation;
p: the pairing operation;
e: the exponential computation.
5.3 Security Proof
In this section we discuss the security of McCLS scheme under the security model discussed in
section 3. The main theorems concerning the security of our scheme are:
Theorem 2. Our certificateless signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against a Type I adversary
AI in the random oracle model under the assumption that the CDH problem in G1 is infeasible.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary AI which has an advantage in attacking McCLS scheme.
We build a challenger C that uses AI to solve the CDH problem. C receives an instance (P,aP,bP) of the
CDHP. Its goal is to compute abP. On the setup phase, C sets P as the generator of the group, and sets
Ppub = aP where a is the master key, which is unknown to AI . In order to avoid collision, C maintains
a list L = (IDi,DIDi ,sIDi ,PIDi) throughout the game. The list is initially empty. C then starts to answer
oracle queries with the following procedures [26]:
• H1 Queries. Suppose AI makes qH1 queries to H1 oracle, where qH1 denotes the maximum number
of queries. Randomly choose j ∈ [1,qH1 ]. When an identity IDi is submitted to oracle H1 where
i ∈ [1,qH1 ], if i = j, assume that IDi = ID∗ at this point, C saves a list L1 = (IDi,Qi,yi) where
Qi = bP, yi =⊥ (indicate to failure). Otherwise,C generates a random number yi and lets Qi = yiP,
then saves L1 = (IDi,Qi,yi).
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• Partial Key Extraction (IDi) Queries. When AI makes the query on IDi, if IDi = ID∗, then C
aborts and halts the simulation. Otherwise C finds L and performs as follows:
– If the list L contains (IDi,DIDi ,sIDi ,PIDi), C checks whether DIDi =⊥. If DIDi 6=⊥, C returns
DIDi to AI . If DIDi = ⊥, and IDi 6= ID∗, C answers with DIDi = yiPpub = yi(aP) as partial
private key. C then returns DIDi to AI and adds it to L.
– If the list L does not contain (IDi,DIDi ,sIDi ,PIDi), C sets (DIDi = yiPpub = yi(aP)). Then
challenger C sets (sID, PID) =⊥ and adds IDi,DIDi ,sIDi ,PIDi to the list L.
• Public Key Extraction (IDi) Queries. When AI makes the query on IDi, C finds L and performs
as follows:
– If the list L contains (IDi,DIDi ,sIDi ,PIDi), C checks whether PIDi =⊥. If PIDi 6=⊥, C returns
PIDi to AI . Otherwise, C picks a random xi ∈ Z∗p, and sets PIDi = xiPpub, sIDi = xi. C then
returns PIDi to AI and adds (sIDi ,PIDi) to L.
– If the list L does not contain (IDi,DIDi ,sIDi ,PIDi), C picks a random xi ∈ Z∗p, and sets PIDi =
xiPpub, sIDi = xi. C then returns PIDi to AI and adds (sIDi ,PIDi) to L.
• Secret Value Extraction (IDi) Queries. When AI makes the query on IDi, if IDi = ID∗, then C
aborts and halts the simulation. Otherwise C finds L and performs as follows:
– If the list L contains (IDi,DIDi ,sIDi ,PIDi), C checks whether DIDi = ⊥. If DIDi = ⊥, C ex-
ecutes Partial Key Extraction Queries to obtain DIDi . If PIDi = ⊥, C makes Public Key
Extraction Queries to obtain sIDi = xi,PIDi = xiPpub. Then C saves the value and adds full
private keys (DIDi ,sIDi) to the list L.
– If the list L does not contain (IDi,DIDi ,sIDi ,PIDi),C executes Partial Key Extraction Queries
to obtain DIDiand makes Public Key Extraction Queries to obtain (sIDi ,PIDi). Then C saves
the value and adds full private keys (DIDi ,sIDi) to the list L.
• Public Key Replacement(IDi,P′ID) Queries. When AI makes the query on (IDi,P
′
IDi
), C finds L
and performs as follows:
– If the list L contains (IDi,DIDi ,sIDi ,PIDi), C sets PIDi = PID′i and sIDi =⊥.
– If the list L does not contain (IDi,DIDi ,sIDi ,PIDi), C sets DIDi =⊥, PIDi = PID′i and sIDi =⊥.
And then C adds to the list L.
• H2 Queries. When AI makes the query on (m,R,PIDi), C first scans if a list L2 = (m,R,PIDi ,h j)
has been defined. If defined, return the list to AI . Otherwise, C picks a random h j ∈ Z∗p as the hash
value and returns h j, and adds it to L2.
• Sign Queries(IDi,M j). When AI asks for a signature by user IDi on message M j. C finds
(IDi,DIDi ,sIDi ,PIDi). If DIDi not found, C runs Partial Key Extraction Queries. If (PIDi ,sIDi)
not found, C runs Public Key Extraction Queries. Note that if IDi 6= ID∗, AI is able to generate
signature on any messages using corresponding full private keys (DIDi ,sIDi). As far as IDi = ID
∗,
assume that PIDi is current public key and corresponding private key sIDi = x, where x ∈ Z∗p, ad-
ditionally submits through the AI . This is because the public key has been replaced earlier by AI ,
then C cannot know the corresponding private key and thus the signing oracle’s answer may not
be correct.
On receiving sign queries, C does the following:
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1. Choose random r j ∈ Z∗p and look up the list L2 for h j, if not found, C runs H2 Queries to get
h j.
2. Compute Vj = h j(x+
a
r j
)P and S j = r jQi = r jbP,R j = xP;
3. Return the signature σ = (Vj,S j,R j).
Now, σ is returned to AI , which appears to be valid signature since
e(Vj−h jR,S j/h j)
= e(h j(x+
a
r j
)P)−h jxP,r jbP/h j)
= e(h jaP/r j,r jbP/h j)
= e(aP,bP)
= e(Ppub,QID).
Finally, AI will output a valid forgery r = (ID j,M j,R j,S j,Vj). If ID j 6= ID∗, C outputs the FAIL
and aborts the simulation. Otherwise, we can compute r j through r j =
ah j
V j−h jx [21], since (Ppub,VjP−
h jR j,S j/h j,Qi) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. Apply r j to S j, we have
S j =
ah j
Vj−h jxQi
S j =
ah j
Vj−h jxbP
abP = S j(Vj−h jx)/h j .
So abP = S j(Vj−h jx)/h j is the answer to our CDHP instance. If the AI can break our scheme, then
the attacker solves the CDH problem.
Theorem 3. Our certificateless signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against the AII adversary
in the random oracle model under the assumption that the CDH problem in G1 is infeasible.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary AII which has advantage in attacking McCLS scheme. We
build a challenger C that uses AII to solve the CDH problem. C receives an instance (P,aP,bP) of the
CDHP. Its goal is to compute abP. On the setup phase, C sets P as the generator of the group, and sets
Ppub = sP where s is the master key, which is known to AII . In order to avoid collision, C maintains a
list L = (IDi,sIDi ,PIDi) throughout the game. The list is initially empty. C then starts to answer oracle
queries with the following procedures:
• H1 Queries. Suppose AII makes qH1 queries to H1 oracle, where qH1 denotes the maximum number
of queries. Randomly choose j ∈ [1,qH1 ]. When an identity IDi is submitted to oracle H1 where
i ∈ [1,qH1 ], if i = j, assume that IDi = ID∗ at this point, C saves a list L1 = (IDi,Qi,yi) where
Qi = aP, yi =⊥ (indicate to failure). Otherwise,C generates a random number yi and lets Qi = yiP,
and saves L1 = (IDi,Qi,yi).
• Public Key Extraction (IDi) Queries. When AII makes the query on IDi, C finds L and performs
as follows:
- If the list L contains (IDi,sIDi ,PIDi), C checks whether PIDi =⊥. If PIDi 6=⊥, C returns PIDi
to AII . Otherwise, C picks a random xi ∈ Z∗p, and sets PIDi = bPpub, sIDi = xi. C then returns
PIDi to AII and adds (sIDi ,PIDi) to L.
- If the list L does not contain (IDi,sIDi ,PIDi), C picks a random xi ∈ Z∗p, and sets PIDi = bPpub,
sIDi = xi. C then returns PIDi to AII and adds (sIDi ,PIDi) to L.
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• Secret Value Extraction (IDi) Queries. When AII makes the query on IDi, if IDi = ID∗, then C
aborts and halts the simulation. Otherwise C finds L and performs as follows:
- If the list L contains (IDi,sIDi ,PIDi),C checks whether PIDi =⊥. If PIDi =⊥,C makes Public
Key Extraction Queries to obtain (sIDi = xi,PIDi = xiPpub). ThenC saves the value and adds
user’s private keys sIDi to the list L.
- If the list L does not contain (IDi,sIDi ,PIDi), C executes Public Key Extraction Queries to
obtain (sIDi ,PIDi). Then C saves the value and adds user’s private keys sIDi to the list L.
• H2 Queries. When AII makes the query on (m,R,PIDi),C first scans whether a list L2 =(m,R,PIDi ,h j)
has been defined. If defined, return the list to AII . otherwise, C picks a random h j ∈ Z∗p as the hash
value of Hand returns h j, and adds it to L2.
• Sign Queries(IDi,M j). When AII asks for a signature by user IDi on message M j. C finds
(IDi,sIDi ,PIDi). If (PIDi ,sIDi) not found, C runs Public Key Extraction Queries.
On receiving sign queries, C does the following:
1. Choose random r j ∈ Z∗p and look up the list L2 for h j, if not found, C runs H2 Queries to get
h j.
2. Compute Vj = (
sh j+bh j
r jxi
)P and S j = r jxiQi = r jxiaP,R j =
bP
r jxi
;
3. Return the signature σ = (Vj,S j,R j).
Now, σ is returned to AII , which appears to be valid signature since
e(Vj−h jR,S j/h j)
= e((
sh j+bh j
r jxi
P)−h j bPr jxi ,r jxiaP/h j)
= e(
sPh j
r jxi
,r jxiaP/h j)
= e(sP,aP)
= e(Ppub,QID).
Finally, AII will output a valid forgery r = (ID j,M j,R j,S j,Vj). If ID j 6= ID∗, C outputs the FAIL and
aborts the simulation. Otherwise, we can compute r through r j =
sh j+bh j
xVj
, since (Ppub,VjP−h jR j,S j/h j,Qi)
is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. Apply r j to S j, we have
S j =
sh j +bh j
xiVj
xiQi
S j =
Qish j +bh jaP
V
abP =
Vjr j−QiS jh j
h j
.
So abP = V jr j−QiS jh j
h j
is the answer to our CDHP instance. If the AII can break our scheme, then the
attacker solves the CDH problem.
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Table 2: General parameters
Parameter Value
Transmitter 250m
Bandwidth 2Mb/s
Simulation time 600s
Environment 900m×900m
Traffic type CBR (Constant Bit Rate)
Packet rate 4 packets/s
Packet size 512 bytes
Node maximum speed 0, 5,10,15,20 m/s
Pause time 0s
Attack nodes 1,2 and 4 Redirection, 1,2 and 4 Rushing
Queuing policy at routers First-in-first-out
6 Evaluation and Analysis
In this section, an efficient McCLS scheme named McDV based on the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance
Vector Routing (AODV) is proposed. We start the simulations using QualNet [19] in order to compare
the original AODV protocol without any security requirements with McDV based on the CLS with rout-
ing authentication extension. We also evaluate the performance of two schemes under 1, 2 and 4 nodes
redirection attacks and 1, 2 and 4 nodes rushing attacks, as this is more realistic in the real emergency
applications. Our implementation retains most of the AODV mechanisms, such as route discovery, re-
verse path setup, forwarding path setup, route maintenance, and so on. In our experiments, 20 nodes
move around in a rectangular area of 900×900m according to a mobility model, i.e., the random way-
point model. The nodes spread randomly over the network. Each node starts its journey from a random
location to a random destination. We vary the nodes speed from 0m/s to 20m/s, and set the nodes pause
time as 0s. Table 2 lists the values of the common parameters used in all experiment. Other parameters
will be given in the description of each specific experiment.
The performance of McDV is compared using the following performance metrics.
• Packet Delivery Ratio: Ratio of the number of packets received by the destination over the number
of packets sent by the source.
• RREQ Ratio: Ratio of sum number of RREQ initiated, forwarded and retried over the sum of
number of data packets sent as source and data packets forwarded. Present the number of RREQ
packets transmitted through the network.
• End-to-End Delay: The average time experienced by each packet when traveling from the source
to the destination.
• Throughput: Ratio of the total bytes sent by all sources nodes over the total time.
• Packet Drop Ratio: Ratio of the number of packets discarded by attacking nodes over the total
number of packets sent by all sources.
Effects of various metrics on different protocols: Experiments in this section are used to study the
performance between McDV and AODV. The results are shown in Fig. 1.
The packet delivery ratio and the RREQ ratio are shown in Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b), respectively. We
can see that McDV could work well in the experiment because the packet delivery ratio and RREQ ratio
in AODV are very similar to that of McDV, without causing any substantial degradation of the network
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Figure 1: Effects of various metrics on different protocols
performance. As nodes speed increases, the number of data packets reaching the destination decreases
and the number of RREQ packets transmitting through the networks increases.
End-to-end delay of McDV scheme is shown in Fig. 1(c). Our scheme has a little bit higher delay
than that of AODV due to the exchange of packets during authentication phase of the security process.
Result shows that McDV has a similar end-to-end delay with AODV at a relatively low speed, however,
when the maximum speed of nodes is higher than 15m/s, AODV outperforms McDV scheme. More
specifically, our scheme needs authentication operation, and those additional operations are computed
in our scheme but not in AODV. We only measure delays for data packets that survived to reach their
destination.
Throughput of McDV works well as result shown in Fig. 1(d) because the effect of throughput of the
network is very small (around 0.16%). However, if this scheme in other real scenarios such as disaster
scenarios, battlefield scenarios, or even very high-speed scenarios, the effect of throughput of the network
may reduce more than this.
Effects of multiple attackers with redirection attacks: We simulated AODV and McDV under
redirection attacks by varying the nodes speed from 0m/s to 20m/s while setting the number of attack
nodes to 1, 2 and 4 nodes, respectively. We first study the packet delivery ratio and packet dropped
ratio. From the results of Fig. 2(a), we can see that packet delivery ratio drops as the speed increases
when we use AODV routing protocol under redirection attacks. Meanwhile, we observe that given the
same speed of nodes, the higher the number of attackers, the lower the packet delivery ratio in AODV.
The packet delivery ratio in the case of 4 attackers declines dramatically to 43% as the speed of nodes
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(c) End-to-End Delay under multiple redirection attacks (d) Throughput under multiple redirection attacks
Figure 2: Effects of multiple attackers with redirection attacks
increases to 15m/s. In contrast, the packet delivery ratio of McDV maintains from 94% to 98% even the
number of attackers increases to 4 which is slightly lower than normally packet delivery ratio as we can
see in Fig. 1(a). All of these are brought by the fact that our routing scheme retains most of the AODV’s
mechanisms and the extra operations of sign phase and verification phase are very low.
As we would expect from Fig. 2(b), McDV is able to detect all redirection attacks and the packet
dropped ratio is zero. On the contrary, as the attack nodes increase, the packet dropped ratio also rises
at the same speed when using AODV. Especially, the highest packet dropped ratio of AODV is almost
25% at speed of 15m/s. McDV can detect all the attacks because the node will verify the signature when
it receives the packet. Only if this packet passes the verification, the receiving node updates its routing
table entry according to the information carried in the packet. Otherwise, the node will drop this packet.
Readers may note that in Fig. 2(c), given the same speed of nodes, the end-to-end Delay in the McDV
under redirection attacks are slightly higher than the end-to-end delay in the AODV under redirection
attacks. This is simply due to our definition of the end-to-end delay, which is defined as the time a packet
takes to travel from the source to the destination. Given the same network size, the same number of
senders and the same number of receivers, as attacker or more attackers are added to the network, the
number of available nodes forwarding packet decreases, making the average end-to-end delay decrease.
The result in Fig. 2(d) shows the throughput in the network. We can see that the higher the attackers,
the lower the throughput at the same speed in AODV. As the speed goes up in AODV, the throughput of
network decreases. When the speed is 15m/s, the throughput of AODV drops to 76% comparing with
that of original protocol. In contrast, our scheme has the similar trend as the original AODV protocol.
As the speed is 15m/s and the network is under 4 redirection attackers, the most effect of throughput is
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(c) End-to-End Delay under multiple rushing attacks (d) Throughput under multiple rushing attacks
Figure 3: Effects of multiple attackers with rushing attacks
around 0.9%.
Effects of multiple attackers with rushing attacks: In this section, we compare the varying metrics
of AODV and that of McDV under 1, 2 and 4 rushing attacks, respectively. The graph in Fig. 3(a) shows
that, the higher the nodes speed, the lower the packet delivery ratio is when using AODV. However, the
packer delivery ratio declines dramatically to 24% as the number of attackers increases to 4 nodes and
at the speed of 20m/s. On the other hand, the lowest packet delivery ratio in McDV still maintains 95%
when the nodes are at the speed of 15m/s. The Fig. 3(b) shows that, given the same speed, the higher the
attacker node(s), the higher the packet dropped ratio is under AODV. In contrast, McDV can detect all
the rushing attacks, thus the packet dropped ratio is zero.
These results indicate that the AODV protocol performs worse under the rushing attacks than under
the redirection attacks. This is because we set the transmit distance as 740m to simulate the rushing
attacks. In this situation, the malicious nodes may readily access to the forwarding group and discard all
data packets. With the number of attackers increasing, the packet delivery ratio decreases and the packet
dropped ratio rises. In contrast, McDV maintains high packet delivery ratio and the packet dropped
ratio is zero. This is due to its less computation overhead and efficient implementation of signature and
verification.
The Fig. 3(c) shows that the end-to-end delay in rushing attacks. McDV end-to-end delay is slightly
higher than AODV end-to-end delay. The explanation for this is similar to the situation discussed in the
case of redirection attacks. The difference is that when a node is converted to attacker, the probability
of this attacker being selected into the forwarding group increases, and the average end-to-end delay
decreases.
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Fig. 3(d) shows the throughput of two protocols under rushing attacks. Although mechanisms of
redirection attacks and rushing attacks are different, they have a similar way to affect the throughput.
The throughput drops more severely under rushing attacks than under redirection attacks. In particular,
the lowest throughput almost drops to 63% under 4 rushing attacks when nodes at the speed of 20m/s.
In contrast to the AODV protocol under rushing attacks, our scheme has very similar throughput to the
original protocol.
7 Conclusion
An efficient certificateless signature scheme named McCLS is proposed in this paper. This scheme
is based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model for emergency mobile
wireless cyber-physical systems. Since McCLS only requires one pairing operation in the verification
phase, and none in the signing phase, theoretically it is more efficient than existing certificateless sig-
nature schemes. We also present simulation of McDV which is based on McCLS scheme and compare
its performance under two most common attacks (i.e. redirection attack and rushing attack) with typical
protocol-AODV providing no protection mechanism. These results show that McDV can completely
resist the two kinds of attacks without causing substantial degradation of network performance. In the
future, we will further investigate security schemes in the wide physical environment. Thereby we can
find schemes which either prevent more comprehensive external attacks or resist internal attacks from
the compromised nodes.
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